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A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
THE NEW ZEALAND TORT OF 
INTRUSION  
NA Moreham* 
This article examines the desirable scope of the New Zealand tort of intrusion into seclusion. It 
begins by developing a six-part taxonomy of common law privacy interests and then, using that 
taxonomy as its starting point, asks which privacy interests the New Zealand intrusion tort should 
cover. It argues that although the intrusion tort is a very welcome addition to New Zealand common 
law, it is important that its parameters are clearly delineated. The best way to achieve that, it is 
suggested, is by recognising that unwarranted listening, watching or recording of private activities 
is the gravamen of the new tort.   
I INTRODUCTION 
Since the turn of the century, two important privacy torts have entered the New Zealand 
common law landscape. The first, established by a majority of the Court of Appeal in Hosking v 
Runting in 2004, protects against highly offensive publicity being given to private facts or 
information.1 The second, first recognised by the High Court in C v Holland in 2012, protects 
against highly offensive intrusions into intimate personal activity, space or affairs.2 Recognition of 
these actions – which reflect similar developments elsewhere in the Commonwealth – represents a 
significant step forward in the protection of privacy in New Zealand. Questions remain, however, 
about the precise scope of the two actions and the relationship between them.  
This article examines those questions in respect of the tort of intrusion into seclusion. It does 
this, first of all, by identifying retreat and inaccessibility as the basis for New Zealand common law 
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1  Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
2  C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155, [2012] 3 NZLR 672. 
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understandings of privacy and providing a taxonomy of six sub-interests that fall within that interest. 
Then, in Part III, the article discusses which of those six privacy sub-categories should come within 
the scope of the intrusion tort. Finally, in Part IV, the intrusion tort is reformulated so that it is clear 
precisely what behaviour it seeks to proscribe and on what legal basis. 
Before embarking on this exercise, it should be acknowledged that a relative paucity of case law 
and the absence of Supreme Court endorsement of either of the privacy torts mean that there is still 
some uncertainty about the status of the New Zealand privacy actions.3 This article will not deal 
with these issues of status expressly; for the purpose of the ensuing discussion, it will be assumed 
that some version of each tort will continue to be part of our law. It is hoped, however, that by 
explaining how the intrusion tort can be clearly and coherently developed, the case for allowing the 
privacy torts to become a fully-fledged part of the common law will be strengthened. 
II A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEW ZEALAND 
COMMON LAW OF PRIVACY 
A Privacy as Retreat or Inaccessibility 
The protection of privacy in New Zealand common law has at its heart the idea of retreat or 
inaccessibility. It is about the ability to remove oneself from the world, to keep certain information 
beyond the reach of others and to exclude strangers from our innermost spaces. Privacy therefore 
protects a realm in which we are entitled to choose, on our own terms, the extent to which we are 
accessed by others.  
This retreat-based conception of privacy has been expressly recognised by New Zealand 
appellate judges. For example, in the Supreme Court case of Brooker v Police McGrath J said 
(citing this author) that the privacy interest includes both a right to be free from unwanted physical 
access and a separate but overlapping category concerned with the "desire to be free from unwanted 
access to private information".4 In Hosking v Runting, Tipping J also explained that:5  
  
3  In the only Supreme Court case to consider the matter, McGrath J (with whom Tipping and Blanchard JJ 
concurred) adopted the parties' approach of assuming that there is a privacy tort and that the limits of the 
privacy action were as stated by the majority in Hosking. It was therefore "unnecessary" to consider 
Hosking in detail: Rogers v Television New Zealand Ltd [2007] NZSC 91, [2008] 2 NZLR 277 at [99]. 
Anderson J agreed with this approach but said that both the existence and requirements of the privacy tort 
would need to be reviewed by the Supreme Court in an appropriate case: Rogers at [144]. Elias CJ 
emphasised the differences between the claims in Hosking and Rogers (particularly the overlap with breach 
of confidence in the latter) and stressed that the Court of Appeal in Hosking "did not purport to establish the 
limits of the tort in all circumstances": Rogers at [23]. She therefore disagreed with the majority approach of 
adopting the Hosking test for the purposes of the Rogers appeal.  
4  Brooker v Police [2007] NZSC 30, [2007] 3 NZLR 91 at [123] citing NA Moreham "The Protection of 
Privacy in English Common Law: a doctrinal and theoretical analysis" (2005) 121 LQR 628 at 640–641. 
See also Thomas J's description of the home as a "sanctuary" and a place "to retreat or repair to": Brooker at 
[257]. 
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Privacy is potentially a very wide concept; but, for present purposes, it can be described as the  right to have 
people leave you alone if you do not want some aspect of your private life to become public property. Some 
people seek the limelight; others value being able to shelter from the often intrusive and debilitating stresses 
of public scrutiny … It is of the essence of the dignity and personal autonomy and well-being of all human 
beings that some aspects of their lives should be able to remain private if they so wish. Even people whose 
work, or the public nature of whose activities make them a form of public property, must be able to protect 
some aspects of their lives from public scrutiny. 
Recognition of this need for retreat and inaccessibility and of the sanctity of the domestic sphere 
has a long been a feature of the common law. As early as 1765, the plaintiff in Entick v Carrington 
successfully complained that the King's messengers:6 
… broke open the doors to the rooms, the locks … the boxes, chests, drawers, etc … and read over, 
pryed into, and examined all [his] private papers, books, etc" as a result of which "the secret affairs, etc 
of the plaintiff became wrongfully discovered and made public". 
And in the 1849 case of Prince Albert v Strange, Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce described the 
unauthorised publication of etchings which Prince Albert had made for his own and his family's 
private amusement as:7 
… an intrusion – an unbecoming and unseemly intrusion … offensive to that inbred sense of propriety 
natural to every man – if intrusion, indeed, fitly describes a sordid spying into the privacy of domestic 
life – into the home (a word hitherto sacred among us) … 
Some 152 years later, the need to protect physical and metaphorical space was recognised by 
Mustill LJ (as he then was) in R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex p BBC:8 
To my mind the privacy of a human being denotes at the same time the personal "space" in 
which the individual is free to be itself, and also the carapace, or shell, or umbrella, or whatever 
other metaphor is preferred, which protects that space from intrusion. An infringement of 
privacy is an affront to the personality, which is damaged both by the violation and by the 
demonstration that the personal space is not inviolate. 
  
5  Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [238]–[239] (emphasis added). See also Lake v Wal-mart Stores 582 NW 
2d 231 (Minn 1998) at 235 per Blatz CJ: "The right to privacy is an integral part of our humanity; one has a 
public persona, exposed and active, and a private persona, guarded and preserved. The heart of our liberty is 
choosing which parts of our lives shall become public and which parts we shall hold close." 
6  Entick v Carrington (1765) 2 Wils KB 275 at 275, (1795) 95 ER 807 (KB) at 807. 
7  Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 2 De G & SM 652 at 698, (1849) 64 ER 293 (Ch) at 313.  
8  R v Broadcasting Standards Commission, ex parte British Broadcasting Corp [2001] QB 885 (CA) at [48]. 
The Court of Appeal upheld the Broadcasting Standards Commission's decision that the secret filming of 
sales assistants inside an electronics store was a breach of privacy. 
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The ideas of retreat and inaccessibility which underpin these dicta also feature strongly in 
academic writing. For example, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis explained in their celebrated 
1890 article that the intensity and complexity of modern life "have rendered necessary some retreat 
from the world".9 They therefore stressed the importance of "the right of the individual to be let 
alone", of "inviolate personality" and "a right to privacy".10 Other scholars articulate this need for 
retreat through the concept of access. For example, in Ruth Gavison's widely adopted definition, 
privacy is seen as "a limitation of others' access to an individual" which is lost whenever a person 
finds out about, pays attention to, or gets close enough to a person to touch or observe him or her 
through the normal use of the senses.11 Ernest van den Haag also defines privacy as the exclusive 
access of a person to a realm of his or her own, the right to which entitles a person to exclude others 
from watching, utilizing, or invading his or her private realm.12 More recently, Kirsty Hughes has 
said that "an invasion of privacy occurs when Y (the intruder) breaches a privacy barrier used by X 
(the privacy-seeker) to prevent Y from accessing X".13  
B Creating a Taxonomy of Privacy Interests 
The human need for retreat or inaccessibility can, therefore, be seen as the value underpinning 
the New Zealand torts of breach of privacy. In order to understand the nature of the privacy interest, 
however, this concept of access needs to be deconstructed further. We need to know what typical 
breaches of privacy look like, how they can be distinguished from one another and whether they can 
be usefully categorised. Case law and popular discourse provide a useful launching pad for this kind 
of discussion. So if you were to ask an average group of New Zealanders what a breach of privacy 
looks like what might they say?  
The first thing a typical group of individuals might talk about when asked what amounts to a 
breach of privacy is the dissemination of private material in the media, on the internet or elsewhere. 
They might point to a recent media exposé of a public figure's philandering, for example, to 
instances of ex-partners posting explicit sexual photographs on social media, or of hackers posting 
hacked financial records online. They might also tell you it would be a breach of their privacy to 
  
9  Samuel D Warren and Louis D Brandeis "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4 Harv L Rev 193 at 196. 
10  At 205, 211 and 213 respectively. 
11  Ruth Gavison "Privacy and the Limits of the Law" (1980) 89 Yale LJ 421 at 428–33. 
12  Ernest van den Haag "On Privacy" (1971) 13 NOMOS 149 at 149.  
13  Kirsty Hughes "A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications for Privacy Law" (2012) 75 
MLR 806 at 810. See also Michael Weinstein "The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life" (1971) 13 NOMOS 
88 at 94 who defines privacy as a condition of voluntary limitation of communication to or from certain 
others with respect to specified information of "perceived good"; and Stanley Benn "Privacy, Freedom and 
Respect for Persons" (1971) 13 NOMOS 1 at 3–4 who says that the right to privacy includes a claim "not to 
be watched, listened to, or reported upon without leave, and not to have public attention focused upon one 
uninvited". 
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watch them in their bathrooms, to listen in on their telephone conversations, or to video them 
surreptitiously in their bedrooms. And perhaps they would say that it would be a breach of privacy 
for you to enter their home or hotel room, to lie in their bed, rifle through their drawers or to go 
through their wallet, car glove box or smartphone. 
All of these activities have been held to be part of a right to privacy by common law courts in 
New Zealand, and/or other common law jurisdictions. In New Zealand, it is actionable 
surreptitiously to film someone in the shower, to publish intimate sexual images without the 
subject's consent, or to reveal private information about, for example, a person's struggles with 
mental illness, the fact that he or she has made a sex offence complaint, or that he is a boy whose 
mother was allegedly murdered by his father.14 In England, Canada, Australia and the United States, 
defendants have been liable for kissing-and-telling, publishing naked photographs or videos, for 
revealing health information or the contents of someone's diary, listening in on people's 
conversations, spying on or videoing people engaged in private acts, or entering a person's home 
without leave.15  
Multifarious though they are, these different types of privacy interference can be organised into 
two main categories: the misuse of private information (informational privacy) and unwanted 
physical access (physical privacy).16 The principal objection in the first category – the informational 
  
14  See respectively C v Holland, above n 2; L v G [2002] NZAR 495 (DC); P v D [2000] 2 NZLR 591 (HC); A 
v Fairfax New Zealand Ltd HC Wellington CIV-2011-485-569, 28 March 2011; JJC v Fairfax New Zealand 
Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2011-404-5605, 15 September 2011. See also Brown v Attorney-General [2006] 
NZAR 552 (DC) in which police were found liable for distributing a flier identifying the plaintiff (by full 
name and photograph) as a convicted paedophile living in the area. 
15  See for example PJS v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2016] UKSC 26, [2016] 2 WLR 1253 (regarding 
kissing-and-telling and sexual information); AMP v Persons Unknown [2011] EWHC 3454 (TCC), Jane 
Doe 464533 v ND 2016 ONSC 54, 2016 CarswellOnt 911, Wilson v Ferguson [2015] WASC 15 (all 
regarding sexual images); Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 AC 457 (regarding health 
information); Associated Newspapers Ltd v HRH Prince of Wales [2006] EWCA Civ 1776, [2008] Ch 57 
(regarding the diary); Roach v Harper 105 SE 2d 564 (WVa 1958) (regarding intercepted calls); Malcolm v 
Fleming 2000 CarswellBC 1316 (BCSC), Lee v Jacobson 1992 CarswellBC 1119 (BCSC) (both regarding 
spying on a videoing private acts); and Miller v National Broadcasting Co 187 CalApp 3d 1463 (Cal App 2 
Dist 1986) (regarding entering a person's home).  
16  For a fuller development of this argument see NA Moreham "Beyond Information: Physical Privacy in 
English Law" (2014) 73 CLJ 350; and Moreham, above n 4. Many academics divide the concept along 
similar lines: see for example Gavison, above n 11, at 428–440; Daniel J Solove "A Taxonomy of Privacy" 
(2006) 154 U Pa L Rev 447 at 489; Tom Gerety "Redefining Privacy" (1977) 12 Harv CR-CL Law Rev 233 
at 261ff; Benn, above n 13; James Rachels "Why Privacy is Important" (1975) 4 Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 323 at 326; Judith Wagner De Cew "The Scope of Privacy in Law and Ethics" (1986) 5 L & Phil 
145 at 153–158; van den Haag, above n 12, at 149–153; Rachael Mulheron "A Potential Framework for 
Privacy? A Reply to Hello!" (2006) 69 MLR 679 at 696–701; Chris Hunt "Conceptualizing Privacy and 
Elucidating its Importance: Foundational Considerations for the Development of Canada's Fledgling Privacy 
Tort" (2011) 37 Queen's LJ 167 at 201; Raymond Wacks Privacy and Media Freedom (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2013) at ch 6; and Hughes, above n 13, at 810–811. See also Australian Law Reform 
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privacy cases – is to the fact that someone is finding out something about you against your wishes. 
Perhaps he or she learns that you have a sexually-transmitted disease, that you enjoy cross-dressing 
in private, or that you are having relationship difficulties. These informational privacy interferences, 
in turn, take two main forms. First, a person can discover things about you that you wish to keep to 
yourself (by reading your diary, acquiring your bank records, hacking your e-mails, for instance). 
And, secondly, the person can disclose private information about you to others, by passing on 
gossip, uploading private material to the internet, or disseminating it in the media, for example.  
The second category – physical privacy – is about unwanted access to the physical self. The 
interference in these cases is primarily sensory and spatial: the intruder interferes with your physical 
privacy by watching or listening to you against your wishes, by recording you, or by getting access 
to your personal spaces. It is these physical aspects of the interest which are at stake when a person 
spies on you in the shower, hacks your telephone calls, videos you in your bedroom or breaks into 
your home when you are not there. As with informational privacy, there is more than one way to 
interfere with physical privacy. First, physical privacy is interfered with if a person observes you 
against your wishes (including with technological aids), for instance, by spying on you as you get 
changed, filming you in the bathroom, bugging you during an intimate telephone call, or entering 
your home while you are not there. Secondly, it is compromised when a person photographs or 
otherwise records these private activities for their own or others' future reference. Thirdly, it is a 
breach of physical privacy to enable others to see or hear you engaged in private activities by 
disseminating photographs or recordings of those private activities to others. Finally, a person can 
breach your privacy simply by obtaining physical proximity to you or your intimate spaces or 
belongings; for example, by entering your house, lying in your bed, or going through your 
backpack, wallet or cupboards without your consent.17 In all of these situations, the concern is 
primarily physical: the observer is, through the use of the senses or physical proximity, physically 
experiencing something of you against your wishes and/or allowing others to do the same.18  
  
Commission Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Final Report (ALRC R123, 2014) at ch 5. For 
discussion of physical privacy see Richard Parker "A Definition of Privacy" (1974) 27 Rutgers L Rev 275 at 
275–288. 
17  This is the case even if the person does not see, hear or find out about anything private (if for example he or 
she broke into your home and simply sat in your bedroom in the dark). Researchers have demonstrated in a 
forthcoming study that the mere presence of another person can affect a subject's willingness to make 
personal disclosures in an on-screen survey even if the third party is unable see the subject or what he or she 
is writing: see Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte and Jeff Hancock "Online Self-Disclosure and 
Offline Threat Detection" (paper presented to the 14th Annual Workshop on the Economics of Information 
Security, Delft, June 2015). 
18  There is, of course, overlap between the physical and informational categories. A person who hacks your 
telephone will not only hear you talking but in all likelihood discover sensitive personal information as well. 
But the concepts remain analytically distinct and, even in cases of overlap, help ensure that all the 
consequences of a breach of privacy are properly recognised and compensated. 
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III WHAT SHOULD THE NEW ZEALAND INTRUSION TORT 
PROTECT? 
So what does all this tell us about the desirable development of privacy protection in New 
Zealand common law? Or more particularly – to return to this article's central inquiry – what role 
should the new intrusion tort play in protecting physical and informational privacy and the six sub-
categories which fall within them?  
A What is Already Covered by the Publicity Tort  
The answer to this question about the desirable role of the intrusion tort depends in large part on 
the privacy-protection role already played by the tort of giving publicity to private facts. This tort 
was first recognised by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand's leading privacy case, Hosking v 
Runting.19 In that decision, a television presenter and his former wife sought to restrain publication 
of photographs of their 18-month old twins being wheeled down a busy Auckland shopping street in 
a push chair.20 The plaintiffs claimed that the photographs breached the children's privacy and, 
given the celebrity status of the first plaintiff, potentially jeopardised their safety. All five judges 
agreed that there was no breach of privacy in the circumstances (because the photographs were of an 
innocuous event which took place in public) but three of the five nonetheless held that there was a 
tort of breach of privacy in New Zealand.  
Two of the majority judges, Gault P and Blanchard J, held that the tort has two requirements: 
first, the existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy and 
second, publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to an 
objective reasonable person.21 A defence of legitimate public concern was also recognised.22 
Tipping J, the third member of the majority, defined the tort more broadly. He asked whether the 
plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of private "information or material" (not 
just facts) and argued persuasively that the highly offensive test was unnecessary (and said that even 
if it were retained, a requirement of substantial offence would be enough).23 
  
19  Hosking v Runting, above n 1. 
20  They brought the action on behalf of their children. 
21  Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [117]. Explaining the highly offensive test further they said at [128]: "The 
concern is with publicity that is truly humiliating and distressful … The right of action, therefore, should be 
only in respect of publicity determined objectively, by reference to its extent and nature, to be offensive by 
causing real hurt and harm". 
22  At [129].  
23  At [249] and [256] respectively. Tipping J is not the only appellate judge to doubt the desirability of the 
highly offensive test. In Rogers v Television New Zealand Ltd, above n 3, at [25] Elias CJ (with whom 
Anderson J concurred) held that the Supreme Court should "reserve its position on the view … that the tort 
of privacy requires not only a reasonable expectation of privacy but also that publicity would be 'highly 
offensive'". The desirability of the high offensiveness test is also doubted in Rogers v TVNZ Ltd [2007] 1 
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All three majority judges restricted the tort to situations where publicity has been given to the 
private material in question. Thus, although the action would potentially cover cases where the 
media published intimate details of a public figure's health problems or extra-marital affair, it does 
not extend to the mere acquisition of that information (if, for example, a defendant accessed but did 
not publish the public figure's medical or telephone records). Nor does it extend to situations where 
a defendant merely watches, records or physically encroaches on a claimant; Gault P and Blanchard 
J left open the question of whether a tort of unreasonable intrusion into solitude and seclusion 
should be developed at some future time.24 Liability for limited disclosures was also excluded, at 
least by Gault P and Blanchard J. A disclosure will not be highly offensive, they said, unless it 
involves "widespread publicity of very personal and private matters": "publication" in the "technical 
sense" that it applies in defamation – that is, to one or a small number of persons – was said not to 
be "in issue".25 So, on this approach, there could be no recovery for breach of privacy if an ex-
boyfriend sent naked photographs of a woman to a handful of her work colleagues or a medical 
centre employee told a woman's religious elders that she had had an abortion.26  
As mentioned, the Supreme Court has declined so far to consider whether the Hosking majority's 
formulation of the privacy tort should be applied in future cases.27 As it stands though, the publicity 
tort covers just two of the six sub-categories of privacy interest identified above: the dissemination 
of private information (part of informational privacy) and of photographs, videos and other 
recordings (part of physical privacy). Four of the six subcategories in the taxonomy therefore fall 
outside it. The next question is what role the intrusion tort should play in protecting those remaining 
interests. 
  
NZLR 156 (CA) at [122] per William Young P; NA Moreham "Why is Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity 
and the Development of the New Zealand Breach of Privacy Tort" in Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd (eds) 
Law, Liberty and Legislation (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) at 231; Thomas Levy McKenzie "The New 
Intrusion Tort: The News Media Exposed?" (2014) 45 VUWLR 79 at 95–97; and Chris DL Hunt "New 
Zealand's New Privacy Tort in Comparative Perspective" (2013) 13 OUCLJ 157 at 163–165. 
24  Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [118]. As will be discussed below, such an action has now been developed. 
25  At [125]. Tipping J does not deal with the matter expressly.  
26  These situations might, however, fall within breach of confidence; in both the examples just given, the 
material is likely to have been acquired in the context of a relationship of confidence. In Giller v Procopets 
[2008] VSCA 236, (2008) 24 VR 1 for example an estranged husband was liable in breach of confidence for 
showing a sex tape of the plaintiff to the mother of one of her friends. See further Ursula Cheer Burrows 
and Cheer: Media Law in New Zealand (7th ed, Lexis Nexis, Wellington, 2015) at ch 5 for a general 
discussion of breach of confidence; JF Burrows in Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New Zealand (6th 
ed, Thompson Reuters, Wellington, 2013) at [17.5.05(1)] on the relationship between privacy and breach of 
confidence; and the discussion of breach of confidence below at 299–301. 
27  See above n 3 and below n 34. 
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B How Far Should the Tort of Intrusion Into Seclusion Extend? 
The tort of intrusion into solitude or seclusion was first recognised by Whata J in the 2012 case 
of C v Holland.28 The plaintiff in that case sued her flatmate for damages after he videoed her 
through a hole in the ceiling while she was having a shower. Proceedings were brought to establish 
the preliminary issue of "whether invasion of privacy of this type, without publicity or the prospect 
of publicity, is an actionable tort in New Zealand".29 Whata J held that it was, regarding the tort of 
intrusion into seclusion as "entirely compatible with, and a logical adjunct to, the Hosking tort of 
wrongful publication of private facts".30 Both torts were said to "logically attack the same 
underlying wrong, namely unwanted intrusion into a reasonable expectation of privacy".31  
According to Whata J, the New Zealand intrusion tort has four key requirements:32  
(a) An intentional and unauthorised intrusion;  
(b) Into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs); 
(c) Involving an infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
(d) That is highly offensive to a reasonable person. 
A legitimate public concern in the information may provide a defence.33 The last two elements, 
Whata J observed, are also part of the tort of giving wrongful publication to private facts (at least as 
articulated by Gault P and Blanchard J in Hosking) and the boundaries of that tort will therefore 
inform development of the intrusion tort where relevant.34 But the action's principal influence is the 
United States tort of unreasonable intrusion into seclusion which, according to the Restatement of 
Torts (Second), imposes liability if a person intrudes physically or otherwise, upon the seclusion of 
another or his or her private affairs or concerns if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a 
reasonable person.35  
  
28  C v Holland, above n 2. 
29  At [1]. The case settled before the substantive hearing took place. 
30  At [75]. 
31  At [75]. 
32  At [94]. For a useful discussion of each of these requirements, see McKenzie, above n 23. 
33  C v Holland, above n 2, at [96]. But as will be explained, this focus on "information" is probably 
inappropriate: see below at 301. 
34  At [96]. 
35  American Law Institute Restatement of Torts (2nd ed, Philadelphia, 1977) §652B as discussed in C v 
Holland, above n 2, at [11]–[20]. United States law also informed the development of the publicity tort: see 
Hosking above n 1, at [117]. 
292 (2016) 47 VUWLR 
The existence of the tort in New Zealand has been implicitly accepted in a handful of cases since 
Holland, including by the Court of Appeal.36 This is welcome. These developments rightly 
recognise that breaches of privacy do not always involve the disclosure, nor even the acquisition, of 
private information. Instead, the objection in many cases is to the act of observing, recording or 
physically encroaching on a person per se. The intrusion tort therefore recognises that, although it is 
a serious breach of privacy secretly to spy on a person in the shower, to film a child changing at a 
swimming pool, or to record a father playing with his children in their bedroom, this is not because 
of the information obtained by the intruder. Instead, the objection is to the fact that the voyeur is 
looking at the claimant when he or she does not wish to be observed; that the watcher has insinuated 
him or herself in at a private moment. As Raymond Wacks says:37 
What is essentially in issue in cases of intrusion is the frustration of the legitimate expectations of the 
individual that he should not be seen or heard in circumstances where he has not consented to or is 
unaware of such surveillance. The quality of the information thereby obtained, though it will often be of 
an intimate nature, is not the major objection. 
1 The need for a conceptual anchor  
Although recognition of the intrusion tort is a positive step, questions remain about its desirable 
scope. Unlike the narrowly-drawn Hosking test, Whata J's formulation of the intrusion action is very 
broad. Indeed, if the words of Whata J's test are taken at face value (without consideration for the 
underlying values the judge was seeking to protect) the action would extend well beyond the 
intrusion at issue in Holland. Judges in the United States have, for example, used the intrusion tort 
to provide protection against sexual harassment in the workplace.38 Even if New Zealand judges do 
not go this far, there is significant scope for the intrusion tort to tread on the toes of existing legal 
actions. For example, widespread publication of private information could readily be seen as a 
highly offensive intrusion into "intimate personal activity, space or affairs" thus undermining the 
narrow boundaries of the Hosking tort. Stalking and unauthorised entry on to private property – 
currently the preserve of the Harassment Act 1997 and trespass, respectively – could also fall within 
the scope of Whata J's formulation.39  
  
36  Graham v R [2015] NZCA 568 at [22]ff; Faesenkleot v Jenkin [2014] NZHC 1637 at [35]ff (but compare at 
[38] where Asher J doubted whether there is a need for separate torts for publication of private facts and 
intrusion); Henderson v Slevin [2015] NZHC 366 at [62]ff; and Duval v Clift [2014] NZHC 1950 at [84]. 
37  Raymond Wacks Personal Information: Privacy and the Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989) at 248.  
38  See for example Phillips v Smalley Maintenance Services Inc 435 So 2d 705 (Ala 1983) at 711; Sphere 
Drake Insurance Plc v Shoney's Inc 923 F Supp 1481 (MD Ala 1996) at 1490; Kelley v Worley 29 F Supp 
2d 1304 (MD Ala 1998) at 1311; and Scott v Estes 60 F Supp 2d 1260 (MD Ala 1999) at 1275.  
39  See for example Galella v Onassis 353 F Supp 196 (SDNY 1972) at 228; and Miller v National 
Broadcasting Co, above n 15, respectively. 
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On one view, this breadth in the intrusion tort's formulation is desirable. Why not, it could be 
asked, let the intrusion action expand to fill the space left by the Hosking tort? Could courts not just 
use the highly offensive test to keep the action within bounds on a case-by-case basis? The reason 
why not is that too broad a conception of the intrusion tort would rob the action of its moral force – 
as with any new legal development it needs to be clear what mischief the new tort is aimed at and 
why. Formulating the intrusion tort too broadly would also lead to unacceptable uncertainty. The 
subjective nature of the interest at the heart of interferences with privacy – a desire for retreat or 
inaccessibility – means that privacy actions need to retain a degree of subjectivity and flexibility. 
But this does not mean that they need to be unclear or imprecise. In fact, it is important that they are 
not. Uncertainty about what people can and cannot do creates fertile ground for vexatious or 
unmeritorious litigation. The threat of such litigation is often enough to silence a person who is 
legitimately asking difficult questions or to bully a person with whom one is in conflict. And 
although a requirement that the intrusion be "highly offensive to a reasonable person" might help 
courts dispose of unmeritorious claims once they get to court, this is a capricious concept which 
cannot be readily understood in advance.40 Much better to develop an intrusion action with a clear 
conceptual anchor, targeting precisely-delineated behaviour and applying readily-identifiable 
criteria for determining the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
  
40  Unlike the reasonable expectation of privacy test (see for example Murray v Express Newspapers Plc 
[2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481 at [36]), judges' conclusions on the offensiveness of a publication or 
intrusion often contain little reasoning that can be applied in future cases. For example Gault P's and 
Blanchard J's conclusion on the offensiveness of the proposed publication in Hosking v Runting, above n 1, 
at [165] was simply "We can't see any real harm in it"; in Henderson v Slevin, above n 36, at [48] and [71] 
Associate Judge Osborne said, without explaining why, that a reasonable person would not think it highly 
offensive for a liquidator to pass on the plaintiff's computer records to an enforcement unit nor to examine 
them himself; and in Clague v APN Ltd [2012] NZHC 2898 at [38] Toogood J said without giving reasons 
that, in spite of the fact that they would undoubtedly be embarrassing to the plaintiff and distressing to him 
and his family, he was not persuaded that publicity around police investigation into allegations of domestic 
assault would be highly offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person. Some limited guidance on the 
requirements of the action can be found in Faesenkleot v Jenkin, above n 36, at [46]–[50] where Asher J 
says that the fact that the filming was incidental to another purpose and there was a weak reasonable 
expectation of privacy made it less offensive. In Andrews v TVNZ HC Auckland CIV 2004-404-3536, 15 
December 2006 at [67]–[73] Allan J also said that the broadcast of the plaintiffs being extricated from a car 
wreck was not offensive because it did not show the plaintiffs in a "bad light" or otherwise embarrass them 
and because the plaintiffs expressed their concern as "chagrin and annoyance" rather than humiliation or 
distress but this approach has been widely criticised: see Moreham, above n 23, at 240–243; Lisa Tat 
"Plaintiff Culpability and the New Zealand Tort of Invasion of Privacy" (2008) 39 VUWLR 365 at 379–
380; Chris Hunt "Breach of Privacy as a Tort" [2014] NZLJ 286; and Jennifer Moore "Traumatized Bodies: 
Towards Corporeality in New Zealand's Privacy Tort Law Involving Accident Survivors" (2011) 24 
NZULR 387 at 402–405. See also Ursula Cheer "The Future of Privacy: Recent Legal Developments in 
New Zealand" (2007) 13 Canta LR 169 at 183–185 for related criticism of the judge's application of the 
public interest defence. 
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What then is the New Zealand intrusion tort's conceptual anchor? A closer look at the New 
Zealand judgments confirms that the intrusion tort was not intended to be a general catch-all privacy 
action. Whata J makes it clear throughout Holland that the tort is about physical imposition on 
personal privacy – spying, observation, surveillance, prying, barging in. Phrases like "intrusion into 
personal space and affairs" and "surveillance and intrusion" therefore appear throughout the 
judgment.41 And when considering the extent to which the interest has been recognised by New 
Zealand legislators, Whata J describes the intrusion interest as:42 
… freedom from unauthorised and unreasonable physical intrusion or prying into private or personal 
places such as the home, and freedom from unauthorised recordings of personal, particularly intimate 
affairs whether published or not. 
Consistently with that, Whata J identifies legislation which protects against surveillance, 
intimate visual recordings, and entering private property as relevant to our understanding of the 
action.43 And, of course, the intrusion at the heart of Holland itself was physical – the defendant 
looked at and recorded the plaintiff's naked body when she was in a secluded place. It is therefore 
not surprising that Fogarty J, speaking for the Court of Appeal in Graham v R, said that "[s]eclusion 
as a concept … connotes an invasion of physical privacy, impinging on one's personal autonomy".44 
It follows that the two New Zealand torts align loosely with the two main privacy interests 
identified in the taxonomy above: the Hosking tort is principally about the protection of private 
information and the intrusion tort is about physical privacy interests. But this only takes one so far. 
It will be recalled that informational privacy has two components – the acquisition and 
dissemination of private information – only the latter of which is covered by the Hosking tort. 
Physical privacy has four components: observing a person, recording a person, disseminating an 
intimate recording (which is the only element to fall within Hosking) and obtaining unwarranted 
physical proximity to a person or his or her intimate things or spaces. The next question then is 
which of these remaining informational and physical privacy interests the New Zealand intrusion 
tort should protect and how. 
  
41  C v Holland, above n 2, at [87], [89] and [92]. 
42  At [32] (emphasis added). 
43  At [28]–[31]. The focus on unwanted watching is also reflected in his identification of advances in "prying 
technology" as a factor making recognition of the tort necessary (at [86]) and his discussion of New Zealand 
courts' treatment of surveillance in the search and seizure context when considering how the intrusion 
interest is protected in other areas of law (at [45]–[48]). 
44  Graham v R, above n 36, at [26(c)]. 
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2 Unwarranted observation and recording 
It is clear from Holland that the intrusion into seclusion tort protects against unwarranted 
watching, listening or recording of a person. This is highly desirable. As the facts of Holland and 
numerous criminal and overseas cases attest, unwarranted spying, eavesdropping and recording is a 
genuine mischief. There dozens of examples in New Zealand, English, Canadian, United States 
jurisprudence of landlords who video, spy or eavesdrop on their tenants,45 employees or business-
owners who spy on people using bathroom facilities or changing rooms at their place of work,46 
neighbours who video or telephone tap the people next door,47 journalists who hack public figures' 
voicemails,48 voyeurs who film or peep inside public toilet facilities,49 and people who film their 
family members or visitors to their own homes.50 These intrusions cause real harm. Plaintiffs tell of 
sleeplessness, anxiety, difficulty socialising and working, suspicion of others, feelings of violation 
and exacerbation of existing mental illness.51 And unlike other aspects of the intrusion interest, 
  
45  See for example Malcolm v Fleming, above n 15, where a video camera was installed to record tenant in her 
bathroom and bedroom; Lee v Jacobson above n 15, where plaintiffs were observed through a peep hole and 
two-way mirror in their bedroom; and Roach v Harper, above n 15, where a bugging device was installed in 
a tenant's apartment. 
46  See for example Harkey v Abate 346 NW 2d 74 (Mich Ct App 1983) and Benitez v KFC National 
Management 714 NE 2d 1002 (Ill App 2 Dist 1999) where employees spied on women's toilets through 
ceiling panels at a rollerskating rink and fast food restaurant respectively; Vigon v DPP [1997] EWHC 
Admin 947, [1998] Crim LR 289 where a man installed a video camera in the changing cubicle of his 
market stall to film people trying on swimwear; R v Turner [2006] EWCA Crim 63, [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 
51 where a sports centre manager filmed female customers in the shower; and R v Sultan Al-Sayed [2009] 
EWCA Crim 1922, [2010] 1 Cr App R (S) 86 where a man used a mirror to look at child in leisure centre 
changing room. 
47  See for example R v Sippings [2008] EWCA Crim 46, [2008] 2 Cr App R (S) 58 where a man videoed his 
teenaged neighbour going about everyday activities in her bedroom over a five year period; and Rhodes v 
Graham 37 SW 2d 46 (Ky Ct App 1931) and Watts v Klaemt 2007 BCSC 662, 2007 CarswellBC 1000 
where the defendants recorded their neighbours' telephone conversations for a year. 
48  See for example Gulati v MGN Ltd [2015] EWHC 1482, [2016] FSR 12 (Ch) concerning tabloid hacking of 
public figures' voicemails. 
49  See for example R v Hancock [2010] EWCA Crim 390 where a man filmed women using toilets at the 
Glastonbury music festival; and R v Ching Choi (EWCA) 7 May 1999 where a man filmed women using the 
female lavatories in a Chinese supermarket. 
50  See for example LAM v JELI 2008 BCSC 1147, 2008 CarswellBC 1784 where a man filmed his former 
partner and her young daughter in the bathroom of his home; R v IP [2004] EWCA Crim 2646, [2005] 1 Cr 
App R (S) 102 where a man videoed his adult step-daughter in the shower; and R v Hancock, above n 49 
where a man filmed a woman using the toilet in his home.  
51  Six of the eight plaintiffs in Gulati v MGN Ltd, above n 48, felt "violated" and/or "sickened" by systematic 
tabloid hacking of their telephone messages: see [247], [273], [407], [513], [571] and [661]. The 
surveillance also exacerbated one plaintiff's obsessive paranoid mental health condition (at [569]); another 
became so distrustful that he still lived in a house surrounded by CCTV cameras years later (at [362]). The 
plaintiff in C v Holland, above n 2, suffered distress and anxiety so acute that she was unable to go out in 
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without the intrusion tort there is no effective common law redress for this kind of voyeurism.52 The 
first two subcategories of the physical privacy interest – unwarranted observation and recording – 
therefore clearly should fall within the intrusion tort.  
3 Disseminating a recording of person engaged in an intimate act 
The third category from the list of physical privacy interferences listed above – disseminating a 
recording of a person engaged in private activities – is not mentioned expressly in Holland. It fits 
more readily within the current formulation of the Hosking tort. But the harm at issue in this 
subcategory – being observed in an intimate image or recording – is often the same as that in 
question in the Holland case. It is about the fact that someone is seeing or hearing you when you did 
not want to be observed; that he or she sees a video of you in the shower or hears a recording of you 
doing or saying something intimate. Recognition of the physical element in these cases is important. 
To focus just on the information contained in these recordings – about what you do in the shower or 
toilet, what you say on the telephone or in bed – is to miss the real nature of the objection. And 
courts do sometimes fall into this trap. When deciding whether there was a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in respect of the images in Hosking, for example, Gault P and Blanchard J focused on the 
facts which the photographs disclosed about the children – their existence, their ages and the fact 
that their parents were separated. Since these were already matters of public record, there was held 
to be no reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the images.53 But, with respect, this was to 
ask the wrong question; the plaintiffs' real complaint was that, if published, the images would have 
allowed thousands readers to see the twins on a family outing which would not normally have 
attracted any outside attention.54 The Court needed to address this objection directly rather than 
reduce the photographs to a series of facts about the children.  
  
public for a week after discovering that her flatmate had filmed her in the shower. Other effects such as 
insomnia, nightmares, mistrust of others, fear of the defendant, and feelings of shame continued for months 
after the discovery of the filming: Interview with C (NA Moreham and Yvette Tinsley, Wellington, 27 
March 2014). 
52  Although it is the subject of criminal sanction: see for example Crimes Act 1961, ss 216B and 216C 
regarding the prohibition of the use of interception devices and the disclosure of any communications 
intercepted; Crimes Act 1961, ss 216H, 216I and 216J regarding prohibitions of, respectively, making, 
possessing, or publishing intimate visual recordings; and Summary Offences Act 1981, s 30 regarding the 
offence of peeping or peering into a dwelling house at night. 
53  Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [164]. Tipping J's approach of asking whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in respect of the "information or material" which has been published helps avoid this 
kind of reasoning since it encourages courts to think about the impact of the image as a whole rather just 
than the facts which it communicates: at [249]. 
54  Recognising this, English courts have taken a different approach to these sorts of cases: see Murray v 
Express Newspapers Plc, above n 40; and Weller v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWCA Civ 1176, 
[2016] 1 WLR 1541. 
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One way to ensure that courts appropriately recognise the physical impacts of images or 
recordings is to make their publication actionable under both the publicity and intrusion torts (the 
latter on the basis that it allows others to see plaintiffs' intimate activities for themselves). Courts 
would then be compelled to consider the physical effects of a publication as part of an intrusion 
claim. Alternatively – and probably preferably – courts could continue to deal with all issues of 
dissemination or publicity under the Hosking tort but to recognise expressly that the plaintiff's 
objection to being seen and/or heard by those who access the material is an important part of the 
publicity claim. Liability and remedies for the loss of physical privacy should be imposed 
accordingly.  
Whichever approach is taken, it would be inappropriate to apply Gault P and Blanchard J's 
proposed rule that liability can only attach if the publicity is widespread in cases involving images 
or recordings.55 As courts in other jurisdictions have recognised, disclosure of an intimate image or 
recording – to one's family, say, or a small group of work colleagues or acquaintances – can be 
deeply humiliating and distressing to the subject.56 The privacy torts should therefore have 
sufficient flexibility to extend to such conduct where necessary. 
4 Physical incursions on private space 
That leaves just one more subcategory from the taxonomy of physical privacy interests above – 
physical incursions on intimate space. This subcategory was addressed in Holland; Whata J clearly 
thought that the intrusion tort should extend to "unreasonable physical intrusion … into private or 
personal places such as the home…"57 He does not expressly say what kinds of situations would 
amount to physical intrusions of this nature but he seems to have in mind the kinds of incursions 
listed under the sixth subcategory above, including encroachment on private property and perhaps 
also interference with personal belongings.58  
Although the right to be free from these kinds of intrusions is an important part of the privacy 
interest, the case for extending the New Zealand intrusion tort to include it is not entirely clear. The 
law of trespass already provides protection against unwelcome incursions into bodily integrity, 
private space and belongings.59 Such incursions are actionable without proof of loss and are subject 
  
55  See the discussion above at 290. 
56  See for example Giller v Procopets, above, n 26, in which the defendant was liable in breach of confidence 
for trying to show a sex tape of his former wife to her friends and family. In the privacy context, the extent 
of the disclosure should be relevant to the assessment of the plaintiff's reasonable expectation of privacy, its 
offensiveness and to any remedy awarded. 
57  C v Holland, above n 2, at [32]. 
58  Whata J's reference to restrictions on landlords' right of access to tenanted properties as a legislative 
measure which protects physical privacy supports this interpretation: at [31]. 
59  See Burrows and Todd, above n 26, at chs 4 (trespass to the person), 9 (trespass to land) and 12.2 (trespass 
to goods). 
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to aggravated damages if the trespass is "accompanied by infliction of injury on the claimant's 
proper pride and dignity" (which might well include a breach of privacy).60 Trespass to land or 
goods can therefore provide redress if someone enters or remains on your property without consent, 
rifles through your backpack, goes through your belongings in a hotel or hospital room, breaks into 
your car, or gains access to your home on false pretences (perhaps as part of a "ride along" with 
medical officers or emergency personnel, for example).61 It is questionable whether we need the 
intrusion tort to provide additional protection against such activity. Harassment legislation and the 
offence of being found on property without reasonable excuse provide additional protection against 
incursions into space including, significantly, in situations where trespass cannot apply because the 
plaintiff has no proprietary interest in the land in question.62 And of course, a defendant who sees, 
hears or records anything private in the space into which they have intruded (which would include 
almost anything taking place in a home, hotel room or hospital ward) will already be liable under 
the intrusion tort for the observation itself. 
On the other side of the equation, including physical intrusions into private or personal places 
would introduce significant uncertainty to the action. Would it be an intrusion into personal places, 
for example, to go into your flatmate's bedroom when she was out or was asleep in bed, to ring 
someone at home and yell at him, or persistently to visit a person seeking an interview about some 
alleged wrongdoing? And how would the action interact with the centuries-old action for trespass 
just discussed? Is there not a risk that including physical encroachments within the intrusion tort 
would undermine the carefully developed requirements of that action? It is suggested that the 
  
60  See Mark Simpson, Michael Jones and Anthony Dugdale Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (21st ed, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2014) at [19-70]. On the privacy point see Burrows and Todd, above n 26, at [9.2.07(4)]; 
and W Rogers Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort (16th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2002) at [12.75] (the 
matter is not addressed in subsequent editions). The victim of trespass is also entitled to expel the trespasser 
where necessary: see Hall v Davis (1825) 2 Carrington & Payne 33, 172 ER 16 (Assizes); and Halsbury's 
Laws of England (5th ed, Lexis Nexis, London, 2010) vol 97 Tort at [586]. The victim can claim exemplary 
damages if, inter alia, "the wrongdoer's conduct has been calculated to make a profit exceeding the 
compensation payable to the claimant": Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, at [19-70]. 
61  Ride-alongs (when reporters or members of the public accompany emergency or medical personnel as they 
attend call-outs) have been the subject of successful intrusion claims in the United States: see for example 
Miller v National Broadcasting Co, above n 15; Shulman v Group W Productions Ltd 955 P 2d 469 (Cal 
1998); and De May v Roberts 9 NW 146 (Mich 1881). They would also be actionable under the New 
Zealand intrusion tort (even on the narrow formulation of the action being proposed here) as soon as the 
defendant watched, listened to or recorded anything that could be regarded as private. For persuasive 
discussion of the need to protect vulnerable people from ride-alongs see Moore, above n 40, at 394–396. 
62  See Harassment Act 1997; and Summary Offences Act 1981, s 29. Trespass was unavailable to the plaintiff 
in Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 62 (CA) who was interviewed and photographed in by tabloid journalists 
while lying in his hospital bed recovering from brain surgery. It would also be unavailable if the intrusion 
took place in a hotel room or the house one shares with one's parents: Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] QB 727 
(CA). 
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benefits of including physical intrusions into "private or personal places" within the intrusion tort 
are not significant enough to justify the uncertainty that these unanswered questions create. 
5 Computer hacking and other forms of information acquisition 
So far then, this article has argued that the intrusion tort should focus on wrongful watching, 
listening and recording of a person. Incursions into private places and the dissemination of 
recordings should be dealt with by the Hosking tort, trespass and other actions. But where does that 
leave privacy interferences which fall within the first of the six subcategories identified above, ie the 
acquisition of private information without subsequent publication? Should these kinds of privacy 
breaches – computer hacking, analysis of call data, intercepting e-mails or text messages – be part of 
the intrusion action? 
Hacking which involves the interception of a telephone or video call clearly falls within the 
intrusion tort as it is being defined in this article. So too would hacking which uncovers recordings 
or images (particularly intimate "selfies") stored on the plaintiff's digital device. In both situations, 
the hacking enables the intruder to see and/or hear the claimant engaged in private activities; to look 
at the plaintiff against his or her wishes. But what say the hacking just reveals non-sensory 
information, for example, what the claimant was writing in e-mails, searching for on Google, 
spending his or her money on, or writing about in personal documents? If the material is not 
disseminated further, such conduct will not be caught by the Hosking tort.  
The Court of Appeal in Graham doubted whether such interferences should be actionable under 
the intrusion tort. Fogarty J said that because "[s]eclusion as a concept … connotes an invasion of 
physical privacy, impinging on one's personal autonomy", whether it extends to interferences with 
stored information or digital data is "controversial".63 But in light of the range and intimacy of 
material stored on modern personal devices, there is a strong argument that such an intrusion should 
be civilly actionable in some way. Perhaps courts should be willing to see observation of a person's 
digital activity – by reviewing or monitoring his or her bank transactions, telephone calls or e-mail 
traffic, for example – as a form of watching or surveillance akin to listening in on telephone 
messages or trailing someone as they go about their everyday business.64 If so, such activity could 
potentially fall within an intrusion tort which has as its gravamen protection from watching and 
listening. 
  
63  Graham v R, above n 36, at [26(c)]. 
64  The leading Ontarian intrusion case involves a bank clerk who accessed her partner's former wife's bank 
details at least 174 times over four years: Jones v Tsige 2012 ONCA 32, 108 O.R. (3d) 241. The Court of 
Appeal held that the facts "cry out for a remedy" and awarded the plaintiff CA$10,000 in damages: at [69] 
and [90]. In New Zealand, it is an offence under the Crimes Act 1961, ss 249 and 252 to access a computer 
system for a dishonest purpose or without authorisation respectively. 
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If this reasoning were considered unattractive, however, New Zealand courts could alternatively 
address the acquisition of private information via the action for breach of confidence. In Tchenguiz v 
Imerman, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales held that simply obtaining private or 
confidential information can create liability in that action.65 It followed that the defendants, who 
accessed, copied and passed on to their sister's solicitor, documents which her estranged husband 
kept on a computer server in their shared office, were liable for a breach of confidence. Speaking for 
the Court, Lord Neuberger MR said:66 
… intentionally obtaining such information secretly and knowing that the claimant reasonably expects it 
to be private, is itself a breach of confidence … looking at documents which one knows to be 
confidential is itself capable of constituting an actionable wrong (albeit perhaps only in equity) … In our 
view, it would be a breach of confidence for a defendant, without the authority of the claimant, to 
examine, or to make, retain, or supply copies to a third party of, a document whose contents are, and 
were (or ought to have been) appreciated by the defendant to be, confidential to the claimant. 
The claimant was therefore able to restrain the defendants from looking at the documents again, 
even though there was no evidence that they intended to reveal the contents to any third party.67  
If New Zealand courts were to follow this approach – and it might be open for them to do so – 
then obtaining information or images about a person by hacking into a computer would be 
actionable at common law.68 Detailed discussion of the desirable scope of the New Zealand breach 
of confidence action is beyond the scope of this article, but since the Hosking court eschewed the 
  
65  Tchenguiz v Imerman [2010] EWCA Civ 908, [2011] Fam 116.  
66  At [68]–[69]. This was a significant expansion of the concept of "misuse" which had hitherto involved 
something more than access to confidential information, such as disclosure to a third party or unauthorised 
exploitation of trade secrets: see Tanya Aplin, Lionel Bently, Phillip Johnson and Simon Malynciz Gurry on 
Breach of Confidence: The Protection of Confidential Information (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) at [15.02] and [15.18]–[15.23]). 
67  Tchenguiz v Imerman, above n 65, at [72].  
68  Since Tchenguiz v Imerman is a traditional breach of confidence decision (in the sense that the Court was 
purporting to apply traditional confidence principles rather than the privacy-tort version of the confidence 
action developed since Campbell v MGN Ltd, above n 15) it would seem to be open to New Zealand courts 
to follow it. However, the Court was proceeding on the basis that is desirable for privacy and traditional 
breach of confidence develop consistently (at [66]–[67]) and relied on European Court of Human Rights 
"private life" cases in reasoning (at [68]). But the extent to which the New Zealand law of confidence 
extends beyond situations where there is an established relationship between the parties is contested. 
Compare the narrow views expressed in Hosking v Runting, above n 1, at [46], [201] and [245] with 
Hammond J's more expansive position in R v X [2009] NZCA 531, [2010] 2 NZLR 181 at [47], all usefully 
discussed in Cheer Burrows and Cheer: Media Law in New Zealand, above n 26, at 296–298. In Rogers v 
Television New Zealand Ltd, above n 3, at [24] Elias CJ acknowledged the importance of the relationship 
with breach of confidence to the development of the privacy tort at issue in that case, namely giving 
wrongful publicity to private information. 
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English approach of extending breach of privacy to protect privacy rights, we should be cautious 
about developing parallel actions in confidence to make up for perceived shortcomings in the 
privacy torts.69 Of the two possibilities just canvassed, including hacking within the intrusion tort 
concept of watching or surveillance would therefore seem to be preferable. 
IV HOW THE INTRUSION TORT SHOULD DEVELOP 
A The Reformulated Action 
It is suggested then that the New Zealand intrusion tort should be refined so that rather than 
requiring an "intrusion into seclusion (namely intimate personal activity, space or affairs)", it 
requires as its key component an intrusion into physical privacy by watching, listening to or 
recording a person (with watching potentially including observation of intimate digital activity). 
When considering whether the expectation of privacy was reasonable, courts should consider a 
number of specific factors.70 The first is where the plaintiff was when the observation or recording 
took place: was it a place like a home or a toilet cubicle where people would normally expect 
privacy or was it a place which would generally be regarded as public?71 Secondly, courts should 
consider the nature of the activity in which the plaintiff was engaged with sexual activity, toileting, 
intimate conversations and the experience of trauma, grief or shock carrying particularly strong 
protections. Thirdly, the expectation of privacy should be stronger if a person's intimate body parts 
were exposed. Finally, courts should consider the nature of the intrusion including whether a 
recording was made and whether the observation was part of systematic surveillance of the subject. 
If either of these features was present, the plaintiff's reasonable expectation of privacy would be 
stronger.72 If, in light of these considerations, prevailing social mores say the activity is private then 
the observation and/or recording would be actionable.  
A robust defence to the intrusion action is needed, however, to prevent the action from 
interfering with legitimate attempts to expose harmful or wrongful behaviour. But, rather than ask 
whether there was a public interest in any information obtained (as suggested in Holland), this 
defence should focus on reasons why it might be justifiable to breach a person's privacy by looking 
  
69  Ursula Cheer has also made this point in connection with the issue of identifiability: see Ursula Cheer 
"Privacy: consolidation and further questions" [2007] NZLJ 117 at 119. 
70  The first, second and fourth of which were also identified in the context of the English misuse of private 
information tort in Murray v Express Newspapers Plc, above n 40, at [36]. 
71  The fact that an intrusion took place in public would not be determinative, however. The action could 
potentially be relied on by people are filmed in public whilst their intimate body parts are involuntarily 
exposed or bugged in public during an otherwise inaudible conversation: see Shulman v Group W 
Productions Ltd, above n 61. See also NA Moreham, "Privacy in Public Places" (2006) 65 CLJ 606; and 
McKenzie, above n 23, at 89–93. 
72  If the plaintiff was subjected to systematic surveillance then this should strengthen his or her expectations of 
privacy even if the defendant never observed activities that were particularly private in themselves.  
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at, listening to or recording him or her without leave. It could ask, for example, whether the 
defendant reasonably believed, at the time that it was undertaken, that the unwanted spying, 
listening or recording was necessary to expose harmful or wrongful behaviour.73 If the intrusion 
took place in public, there could also be an additional defence if the defendant's action was 
necessary to provide appropriate media coverage of an event of national or international 
significance.74 As with the publicity tort, the more intrusive the defendant's conduct, the more 
compelling the justification for it would have to be. Thus, whilst it might be almost impossible to 
justify filming a person using a shower or toilet, it might be relatively easy to defend the 
surreptitious recording of an otherwise consensual encounter such as a telephone call.  Further, since 
the physical privacy action is predicated on the need to protect the human values of autonomy and 
dignity, it should only avail natural persons. Corporations, companies and other artificial persons 
should not be able to rely on it. 
The combination of a clear conceptual understanding of physical privacy, express criteria for 
determining whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, and robust defences would 
obviate the need for the "highly offensive to a reasonable person" check on the intrusion action. It is 
almost impossible to imagine a situation in which it would not be highly offensive for a defendant to 
watch, listen to or record a person in circumstances where he or she has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy on the criteria set out above. And if the defendant's motives were noble, the defences will 
avail it. In these circumstances, the highly offensive test merely adds an unpredictable extra element 
to the action and, by raising the bar to recovery too high, risks excluding meritorious claims.75  
B How Should Intrusion Fit with the Publicity Tort? 
An intrusion tort which focuses on observation and recording would interact with the Hosking 
publicity tort without difficulty. Cases which involve the publication of private information will fall 
into the publicity tort whilst those involving watching, listening and/or recording without 
publication will fall into the intrusion tort. So, for example, to post someone's medical secrets, 
sexual fantasies or diary ramblings on the internet would breach the publicity tort but, since there 
was no unwarranted access to the plaintiff's physical person, not the intrusion tort. Conversely, 
  
73  The word "necessary" is intended to imply that the defendant could not have exposed the truth using less 
intrusive means. For further discussion of these issues see McKenzie, above n 23, at 97–100; and Lyrissa 
Barnett Lidsky "Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About 
It" (1998) 73 Tul L Rev 173, discussing defences in the American context. 
74  This defence would most obviously apply if the appearance of the plaintiff was incidental to the filming of 
an event of significant national or international importance such as the aftermath of an earthquake or 
workplace disaster. The defence should be less likely to apply if the event was a tragic but common one 
(such as a car accident), if the subject or someone with him or her was asking for the filming to stop, if the 
filming was otherwise clearly exacerbating the subject's distress, or if the filming did not relate to the 
newsworthy event itself but to the grief of victims or family members suffered afterwards. 
75  See above n 40. 
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spying on people in their bedrooms, bugging their living rooms or filming them using a toilet would 
not satisfy the requirements of the publicity tort (because the defendant has not published the 
recordings) but would be a significant physical intrusion. Where both torts are at stake, courts would 
consider the two claims in tandem. Thus, a person who hacks your telephone calls and broadcasts 
their content will be liable for both the hacking itself (under the intrusion tort) and for publicising 
private information (under the publicity tort). Compensation for the intrusion would focus on harm 
caused by the listening itself: feelings of violation, anxiety, mistrust and, perhaps, the exacerbation 
of existing mental health problems. Compensation for the publicity tort would focus on the 
humiliation, embarrassment, and possible pecuniary damage caused by the disclosure. Problems of 
double-counting therefore need not arise.76 
The defences to the two torts would also reflect the particular privacy interests at the heart of 
each action. As discussed, whilst the publicity tort defence should focus on whether there was a 
legitimate public concern in the information published, the intrusion tort should ask whether there 
was justification for the act of looking, listening or recording itself. This means that a right to 
disseminate will not always follow a right to watch, listen or record and vice versa. Thus, whilst a 
concerned son might have a defence if he installed a video camera to investigate suspicions that his 
mother's carers were neglecting her (having formed a reasonable belief that the recording was 
necessary to expose wrongdoing) there might be insufficient public interest in the footage to justify 
disseminating it.77  
V CONCLUSION 
The tort of intrusion has an important role to play in the protection of privacy in New Zealand 
common law. It recognises – quite rightly – that privacy is not just about the protection of private 
information but also about bodily and spatial integrity; the right to be free from unwarranted spying, 
eavesdropping, bugging and filming when engaged in something private. Protecting these privacy 
interests requires constant negotiation between the need for certainty and flexibility. This article 
argues that that balance is best struck by proscribing unwarranted watching, listening or recording in 
circumstances where the subject has a reasonable expectation of privacy as defined by a number of 
clearly delineated criteria. Clear defences should also apply. An action of this nature – clearly 
conceptualised, precisely formulated and subject to appropriate defences – will provide important 
  
76  For an example of a case where plaintiffs were compensated for physical and informational privacy 
interferences separately see the English telephone hacking case of Gulati v MGN Ltd, above n 48.  
77  The converse might also be true. For example in Shulman v Group W Productions Ltd, above n 61, the 
Supreme Court of California held that although it was an actionable intrusion to record conversations which 
took place between the plaintiff and paramedics who assisted her after a serious road accident, broadcast of 
the footage was justified because it was "newsworthy". Such situations are likely to be rare in New Zealand, 
however, since freedom of expression does not act as a trump card in the way it does in the United States on 
account of courts' interpretation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
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protection for individuals' physical privacy interests. It will also, it is hoped, help show how privacy 
can be translated into a workable legal concept both within the common law and beyond.  
 
 
